When a former Belknap County deputy sheriff was convicted last year of sexually assaulting a female inmate he was transporting to the state prison, it seemed as though justice had been served.
The sexual relationship between Ernest Justin Blanchette, 36, and the inmate was consensual, they both said, but that doesn’t matter in New Hampshire. RSA 632-A:2 states that “a person is guilty of the felony of aggravated felonious sexual assault . . . when the actor has direct supervisory or disciplinary authority over the victim by virtue of the victim being incarcerated in a correctional institution, the secure psychiatric unit, or juvenile detention facility where the actor is employed.”
The logic behind the law is sound and was thoughtfully expressed by Judge Gillian Abramson during Blanchette’s sentencing: “Whether (the victim) was willing or not is completely irrelevant, legally and morally. Inmates are degraded enough by virtue of incarceration. By trading favors for sex, you degraded her even more.”
But in a ruling released on Monday, the state Supreme Court decided that Blanchette did not, in fact, have authority over the victim because he wasn’t employed by the New Hampshire State Prison for Women, where the inmate was incarcerated.
Chief Justice Linda Stewart Dalianis wrote that “the state presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had authority over the victim.”
Although the spirit of the law certainly points to Blanchette’s guilt, the wording itself lacks clarity. The overturned conviction, while frustrating, serves as a reminder of the importance of precision in the crafting of legislation. We hope lawmakers tuck it away as a cautionary tale.
In the meantime, we urge the New Hampshire Legislature to do what Dalianis has invited them to do, which is “amend the language in the (law) to clarify its intent with regard to the meaning of the phrase (‘where the actor is employed’).”
The amended language should make it clear that when it comes to the sexual coercion of an inmate by a figure of authority, being a proxy of the prison is the same as being an employee.